DVLT: Datavault AI Fights Back Against Malicious Attack!

Introduction

Datavault AI Inc. (NASDAQ: DVLT) – formerly WiSA Technologies – is a small-cap tech company that has recently faced extreme stock volatility amid both hype and a “malicious” short-seller attack. The firm rebranded in February 2025 to focus on AI-driven data monetization (Data Science division) alongside its legacy wireless audio tech (Acoustic Science division) ([1]) ([1]). DVLT’s stock skyrocketed roughly 800% in the fall of 2025 on a flurry of press releases and an eye-catching $150 million strategic investment agreement with Scilex Holding Company (a biotech firm) ([2]) ([3]). However, on October 31, 2025, renowned short-seller Wolfpack Research revealed a short position, accusing Datavault of misleading claims and questionable leadership – causing DVLT shares to tumble by double digits ([2]). In response, Datavault has literally “fought back” against what it deems market manipulation, filing a federal lawsuit in July alleging unnamed short sellers engaged in “naked” shorting, spoofing, layering, and online misinformation to drive its stock down ([4]). This report dives into DVLT’s fundamentals – from its nonexistent dividends and leveraged balance sheet to valuation, risks, and red flags – to assess the company’s financial health and the battle it faces.

Dividend Policy & History

DVLT does not pay a dividend, and it has no history of cash dividends or shareholder distributions. The company’s focus on growth (and persistent net losses) precludes any payout – its expected dividend yield is effectively 0% ([5]). In regulatory filings and valuation assumptions, DVLT consistently uses a 0% dividend yield, confirming that shareholders should not expect income from this stock ([6]). Given the negative earnings and cash flow (discussed below), Adjusted or Funds From Operations (AFFO/FFO) metrics are not applicable for DVLT – those metrics are typically relevant for profitable REITs or steady cash generators, which DVLT is not. In fact, the company’s operations burn cash rather than generate excess funds: for the first half of 2025, DVLT reported a net loss of $37.1 million ([7]) and negative operating cash flow, leaving nothing to distribute. Management has not indicated any intent to initiate dividends in the foreseeable future, instead signaling that any future earnings would be reinvested to fuel growth. As a result, DVLT’s dividend yield remains 0%, and investors are betting purely on capital gains (or losses) rather than income.

Leverage and Debt Maturities

Datavault’s balance sheet is highly leveraged, loaded with convertible debt incurred to finance acquisitions and sustain operations. As of June 30, 2025, the company had only $0.66 million in cash against $46.6 million in total liabilities ([8]) ([8]). Notably, DVLT issued a series of convertible notes in 2025:

– “2025 Convertible Notes” totaling ~$21 million were sold to outside investors during 1H 2025 to raise capital ([8]) ([8]). These notes came with warrants and deep discounts – so much so that DVLT immediately recorded a $16.7 million interest expense charge to reflect the notes’ fair value exceeding the cash proceeds ([8]) ([8]). The notes are likely due within a couple of years (terms not fully disclosed publicly), and they carry dilutive conversion features (discussed under Risks).

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– CSI Acquisition Notes: In May 2025, DVLT acquired the assets of CompuSystems, Inc. (CSI), a trade-show software firm, using $15 million of convertible notes issued to CSI’s sellers ([8]). These notes were split into an initial $5 million and two additional $5 million tranches ([8]), all maturing on the second anniversary of closing – i.e. due May 20, 2027 ([8]). Until then, the noteholders may convert to stock under agreed terms. This debt added about $10.05 million on DVLT’s balance sheet by mid-2025 (net of discounts) ([8]).

– Related-Party Note (DV Asset Acquisition): As part of DVLT’s pivot to “Datavault AI,” the company purchased certain data monetization intellectual property on December 31, 2024 from EOS Holdings – a related party tied to DVLT’s CEO’s family ([8]) ([8]). For this “DV asset” acquisition, DVLT issued a $10 million convertible note to EOS (the CEO’s spouse’s firm) ([8]). This DV Note bears unusual terms: it matures in December 2027 (a 3-year term from closing) and cannot be converted until after maturity, unless a change of control triggers earlier conversion rights ([8]) ([8]). The conversion price is 75% of DVLT’s future trading price (10-day VWAP) with a floor at $1.116 ([8]). By June 2025, the related-party note was carried at $7.37 million net after some offset and partial payoff ([8]). A small $0.52 million portion is current (due within 12 months) ([8]), likely representing scheduled payments or interest due.

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In total, DVLT’s interest-bearing debt and notes (excluding routine payables) exceeded $38 million as of mid-2025 ([8]). With stockholders’ equity of only ~$74 million ([8]), the company’s debt-to-equity ratio is ~0.6. However, this understates the leverage risk, as most notes are convertible: if converted, they would massively dilute equity rather than require cash repayment. In the near term, DVLT’s actual cash debt service obligations are modest (only ~$0.5 million due within a year ([8])), but 2027 looms as a significant maturity cliff when the $10 million EOS note and $15 million CSI notes come due (unless converted or refinanced). Importantly, DVLT is counting on new equity capital to shore up its finances well before then – notably the large Scilex investment expected in 2025–2026. If the second tranche of that deal closes (discussed later), it will inject ~$142 million of new equity capital, which management has implied could be used to “strengthen the balance sheet” ([9]) – potentially paying down or restructuring some debt. But absent that infusion, DVLT would likely need to raise more capital or negotiate extensions to handle these maturities, as internal cash generation is currently nowhere near sufficient.

Coverage and Cash Flows

DVLT’s earnings and cash flows are insufficient to cover its fixed charges, reflecting the company’s early-stage, roll-up strategy. In the first half of 2025, Datavault generated only $2.4 million in revenue ([8]) yet incurred an operating loss several times larger. One stark indicator: in Q2 2025, DVLT reported interest expense of $17.2 million for the quarter – up from essentially nil a year prior ([8]). This quarterly interest cost exceeded DVLT’s entire revenue ( ~$1.7 million) by ten-fold ([8]) ([7]). In other words, the company’s EBITDA is deeply negative, and it has no ability to cover interest payments from operations. Much of this interest expense is a non-cash accounting charge (from the discounted convertible notes and warrants) ([8]), but even on a cash basis DVLT is burning money. For the six months ended June 30, 2025, operating cash flow was around –$6.8 million ([7]), reflecting ongoing losses in its businesses and one-time costs of acquisitions.

Coverage ratios like EBITDA/Interest or FFO/Interest are thus not meaningful – DVLT’s coverage is effectively zero or negative. The company survives by raising capital, not by internally funded cash flows. Indeed, management explicitly acknowledges the need for external funding: in an April 2025 shareholder letter, DVLT announced a $15 million convertible note financing to fund its strategy and close acquisitions ([10]) ([10]). Concurrently, DVLT set an ambitious goal to grow revenue to $40–50 million by 2026 ([10]), which, if achieved, could improve coverage in the future. But at present, DVLT’s interest and fixed charges far exceed its gross profit, and the company relies on new financing (debt or equity) to meet obligations. This heavy dependence on external capital raises concerns about sustainability (see Risks below). The recent Scilex deal, if fully funded, would relieve immediate liquidity pressure by adding cash – but it also entails massive dilution, merely swapping one form of obligation (debt interest) for another (future share issuance). Until DVLT can substantially boost its cash flow, coverage of any obligations will remain very weak.

Valuation

DVLT’s valuation surged to lofty levels in 2025 amid the speculative AI fervor. By late October 2025, the company’s market capitalization reached approximately $640 million ([5]) ([5]) after the stock spiked above $3.40 per share. This valuation is extreme relative to DVLT’s modest financial base. Trailing twelve-month revenue is only on the order of a few million dollars – for example, revenue for the first half of 2025 was just $2.4 million (up from ~$0.6 million in H1 2024 thanks to acquisitions) ([8]) ([8]). Even if we annualize the mid-2025 run-rate or include acquired operations’ full-year impact, 2025 sales might be under ~$8–10 million. At a ~$640 million market cap, investors were temporarily valuing DVLT at 80+ times current-year revenue, an exceptionally high P/S ratio that assumes explosive future growth. For context, management’s own optimistic goal is $40–50 million revenue by 2026 ([10]) – even against that future target, the stock (at October levels) was about 13–16× the 2026 sales goal. That is rich, especially since those revenues are aspirational and not yet secured.

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Traditional earnings-based multiples are not meaningful because DVLT’s earnings are negative. On a book value basis, the stock also appeared overvalued: at mid-2025, shareholders’ equity was $74 million ([8]), implying a price-to-book well over 8× at the $640M market cap. Importantly, the quality of that book value is questionable – over $115 million of DVLT’s assets are intangibles and goodwill from recent acquisitions ([8]). Excluding those, DVLT’s tangible book value is deeply negative, so almost all of the company’s valuation rests on the presumed value of acquired tech/IP and future prospects. The market’s exuberant pricing may have been fueled by the AI hype cycle and DVLT’s steady stream of “good news” press releases (new partnerships, exchange launches, guidance increases, etc.). However, as discussed below, a significant portion of the rally was likely driven by speculative trading and promotion ([2]). Indeed, DVLT’s shares have proven highly volatile: after peaking in October, the stock fell sharply in late October/early November once skepticism set in. At the time of this writing, DVLT trades well below its highs, and its market cap has contracted substantially (the stock even hit a fresh 52-week low after the short report). Valuation remains in flux, but clearly DVLT’s pricing is not grounded in fundamentals like earnings or assets – it hinges on future growth narratives and investor sentiment. That leaves considerable downside risk if the growth story falters or if dilution greatly expands the share count (effectively “diluting” per-share valuation).

Risks

DVLT faces numerous risks that prospective investors should weigh, spanning financial, operational, and governance domains:

– Continued Losses & Cash Burn: The company has a long history of net losses (accumulated deficit of $345 million as of mid-2025) ([8]) and negative cash flow. Its current businesses (data monetization platform, event software, audio tech) are in early stages and may not generate positive earnings for some time. DVLT’s ability to achieve its aggressive revenue targets (e.g. ~$45M in 2026) is unproven. If growth disappoints, the company could remain unprofitable and cash-flow negative, forcing further financing and putting pressure on its stock.

– Dilution & Share Count Explosion: DVLT’s strategy has been financed by issuing large amounts of equity and convertible securities – a trend likely to continue. The share count has already ballooned from ~52 million to 97.7 million in the first half of 2025 ([8]) due to conversions and offerings. Much more dilution looms: the Scilex deal will issue up to 278.9 million new shares (nearly tripling the outstanding count) at ~$0.54/share if fully completed ([9]) ([9]). Additionally, conversion of the 2025 Notes, CSI notes, and other convertibles could add tens of millions more shares. Wolfpack Research specifically warned that the $150M Scilex investment could “nearly double Datavault’s outstanding shares” (at the time of their report) and questioned whether the funding would fully materialize ([2]). For existing shareholders, these dilutions mean any future profits (if achieved) will be shared across a far larger base, and earnings per share will be heavily diluted. In the near term, the mere prospect of such dilution can depress DVLT’s stock price. Indeed, DVLT had been flirting with Nasdaq’s $1 minimum price earlier in 2025 ([11]), and a post-rally collapse could again raise delisting risk if the price remains low. The company has used reverse stock splits in the past (e.g. a 1-for-150 split in April 2024) ([8]) to cure price deficiencies; more might be needed if dilution and selling pressure drive the stock under compliance levels.

– Reliance on External Funding: DVLT’s business plan essentially requires continuous external financing. The company candidly noted the need to raise ~$15M in 2025, which it did via convertible debt ([10]), and it sought the much larger Scilex strategic investment to fund its supercomputing and product expansion ([9]). If any planned funding falls through, DVLT could face a liquidity crunch. This risk is real: the second, $142M tranche of the Scilex deal is contingent on shareholder approval and other conditions ([9]) ([9]) – it is not guaranteed to close. Wolfpack’s report cast doubt on the arrangement, highlighting that Scilex planned to fund the deal via Bitcoin and an entity called Biconomy Pte. Ltd., whose legitimacy was questioned ([2]). Should the crypto-financed deal unravel or be delayed, DVLT would be deprived of expected capital and might need to scramble for alternate funding in 2026. Inability to raise capital (due to a low stock price or lack of investor appetite) is a key risk, as DVLT’s going-concern viability hinges on fresh funds.

– Integration and Execution Risks: DVLT has made multiple acquisitions and partnerships in a short time – e.g. the Data Vault/EOS asset purchase (Web3 data platform), CompuSystems (event data management), a partial investment in NYIAX (advertising exchange) ([8]), and numerous announced joint ventures (crypto exchanges, AI partnerships, etc.). Managing and integrating these disparate pieces is a challenge for a small company. There is a risk that management overstretches or that the acquired businesses underperform expectations. Notably, the $19.1 million goodwill on DVLT’s balance sheet ([8]) (from CSI) and $96+ million in intangible assets must eventually generate commensurate cash flows to avoid impairment. If the synergies or growth envisioned do not materialize, DVLT may have to write down those intangibles, eroding its equity and investor confidence. Operationally, execution missteps (delays in building the “supercomputer” or launching exchanges, losing key partners like IBM or Brookhaven Lab, etc.) could derail the growth story.

– Competitive and Technological Uncertainty: The fields DVLT operates in – AI data monetization platforms, blockchain-based exchanges, and even wireless audio tech – are highly competitive and fast-evolving. DVLT is a small player relative to industry giants in AI/cloud and faces competition from many directions. Its ability to secure enterprise clients or meaningful market share in data markets is unproven. There’s also a risk that some of DVLT’s initiatives are more buzzwords than substance. Wolfpack flagged that DVLT’s much-touted “blockchain IDE platform” had minimal activity, with bizarre NFT offerings like “photos of Dr. Oz or Putin vomiting” and virtually no buyers ([2]). If DVLT’s technology and platforms don’t deliver real utility, customers may not adopt them despite the marketing claims.

– Corporate Governance and Insider Concerns: Perhaps most troubling are the red flags around DVLT’s leadership and promotional practices (expanded in the next section). Wolfpack Research’s short thesis centered on CEO Nathaniel T. Bradley’s background, noting that he previously settled SEC charges related to an offering fraud, and highlighting his connections to Edward Withrow III – a convicted felon known in penny stock circles ([2]). Such history raises serious governance risk: shareholders must trust management’s integrity in reporting and executing the business, yet the CEO’s past is checkered. Moreover, DVLT’s pivotal Datavault asset purchase was a related-party deal involving Bradley’s spouse’s company (EOS Holdings) ([8]), which received ~4 million DVLT shares plus that $10M note ([8]) ([8]). While disclosed, this could represent a conflict of interest if not done at arm’s length. The rapid sequence of press releases and retail investor outreach (e.g. frequent paid newswire articles and conference appearances) also suggests DVLT is promotion-heavy. If management has been embellishing facts to boost the stock (as shorts allege), investors face reputational and possibly legal risk. Already, shareholder lawsuits often follow when volatile stocks crash after promotional runs – DVLT could attract such litigation if allegations of misrepresentation are substantiated.

In sum, DVLT is a high-risk speculative stock. It offers the allure of cutting-edge tech themes (AI, blockchain, data monetization), but it also exhibits many classic red flags: relentless dilution, negligible revenues, continual losses, insider self-dealing, and now outright accusations of fraud from short sellers. Investors should be prepared for extreme volatility and the possibility of a significant capital loss if the company fails to turn its narrative into reality.

Red Flags and Controversies

The short-seller attack on Datavault AI has brought several red flags to light, raising questions about the company’s credibility:

– Exaggerated Claims vs. Reality: DVLT has made bold announcements about its facilities and technologies that appear inconsistent with observable facts. For example, the company touted establishing a “Center for AI and Quantum Computing Excellence” with 22,000 sq. ft. floor plates and on-site data centers. Wolfpack investigators visited the purported location and found only a small 2,800 sq. ft. office with minimal staff, directly contradicting DVLT’s grand description ([2]). Similarly, DVLT’s press releases speak of deploying multiple “independent data exchanges” and tokenization platforms. But evidence of traction is scant – as noted, the NFTs on its existing exchange were oddities with no volume ([2]). Such discrepancies suggest that some of DVLT’s public statements may be overhyped or misleading, a classic warning sign.

– Management Track Record: CEO Nathaniel Bradley’s history is a red flag. Wolfpack’s report highlighted that Bradley settled fraud charges with the SEC in the past (details of which have yet to be fully publicized) and that he is linked to Ed Withrow III ([2]), who was convicted for financial fraud. Having an executive with a prior SEC action and associations with known bad actors sets off alarms about the culture at DVLT. It raises the possibility that the company’s aggressive promotional strategy could cross into problematic territory. Indeed, DVLT’s communications often read more like hype than measured corporate updates – e.g. branding a legislative development as the “Genius Act” validating its patents ([12]), or constantly announcing MOUs and partnerships (some of which are with tiny or related entities). The insider ownership and compensation deserve scrutiny too. DVLT’s CEO and insiders may hold significant shares (some via the EOS deal), and if they were to sell into inflated market prices, it would be a severe red flag (there is no evidence of major insider sales yet, but it’s something to watch).

– Stock Promotion Activity: DVLT’s stock surge coincided with what Wolfpack calls “paid stock promotion efforts” ([2]). There have been numerous upbeat articles on minor outlets (Accesswire, InvestorBrandNetwork, etc.) touting DVLT’s prospects, often repeating management’s talking points. The company also presented at multiple microcap conferences and engaged retail investors on social media. While publicity itself isn’t illegal, an abundance of sponsored bullish coverage can indicate an orchestrated campaign to boost share price. Wolfpack argues that DVLT’s ~800% rally was fueled by misleading PR and promotion rather than fundamental developments ([2]). The fact that DVLT’s share price soared ahead of the major Scilex deal closing (rendering the deal hugely dilutive in hindsight) is noteworthy – it suggests traders were chasing momentum. If any parties connected to DVLT benefited from this run-up (for example, if the related-party EOS Holdings could collateralize or sell some of its 40 million shares ([8])), that would be concerning. The pattern of press releases in October – nearly every other day – also raises eyebrows. Many announcements were arguably minor (e.g. relocating HQ, radio station partnerships, launching a “Joke Token” project) ([13]) ([13]), yet each was publicized, contributing to a frenzy. This kind of behavior is a hallmark of companies that prioritize stock price over substance. Investors should be cautious when a narrative seems perhaps too good to be true – DVLT claiming to be at the nexus of AI, biotech, Web3, defense, entertainment, etc., all at once, is a lot to swallow.

– Legal Battles and Accusations: Unusual for a small company, DVLT is taking the offensive by suing unknown short sellers. In July 2025 it filed a federal lawsuit alleging market manipulation, defamation, and securities fraud by parties it has yet to identify ([4]). The complaint (filed in Illinois) claims that malicious actors engaged in naked short selling and spreading false information online to depress DVLT’s stock ([4]). While it’s understandable that management wants to instill confidence, such lawsuits are difficult to win and sometimes are used as a tactic to scapegoat external forces. The lawsuit’s merits are unproven at this stage, and no defendants have been named publicly. This is a red flag in itself because management time and resources might be diverted to a legal crusade rather than fixing core issues. Moreover, if DVLT indeed has been over-promotional as alleged, then accusing others of misinformation could be seen as deflection. The outcome of this legal action is uncertain, but it adds another layer of risk – if discovery unveils inconvenient truths about DVLT’s own disclosures, it could backfire. Conversely, if manipulation was happening, the suit might at best expose some unlawful trading, but that’s speculative. For now, it highlights the contentious atmosphere around this stock: DVLT’s management is essentially at war with short sellers, each side accusing the other of deception. For regular investors, that’s a warning sign to be extremely careful.

In summary, DVLT exhibits multiple red flags often seen in speculative microcaps: overly promotional communications, a CEO with regulatory blemishes, related-party deals, and dramatic claims that don’t match on-the-ground reality. The recent short-seller report crystallized these concerns, and the company’s reputation has taken a hit. While none of these issues guarantee wrongdoing or failure, they significantly elevate the risk. Prudent investors would demand clear evidence of execution (growing real revenues, independent validation of technology, etc.) before trusting the rosy projections. Until then, skepticism is warranted.

Open Questions and Outlook

Looking ahead, several open questions will determine DVLT’s fate and the stock’s performance:

– Will the full $150 million Scilex investment close as planned? The initial tranche of ~$8 million closed in late September (with DVLT issuing 15 million shares) ([3]) ([3]), but the colossal second tranche (~$142 million via a pre-funded warrant for ~264 million shares) requires shareholder approval and hinges on Scilex securing the funds (via Bitcoin) ([9]). Given the unusual structure and Wolfpack’s doubts about the funding source ([2]), there is uncertainty whether DVLT will ever see that money. If the deal falls apart or gets scaled back, how will DVLT plug the gap? Conversely, if it does close, Scilex will become a dominant shareholder (~70% ownership) – what does that mean for DVLT’s strategic direction and governance? This partnership’s outcome is critical: it could either dramatically de-risk DVLT’s finances (by infusing cash) or leave the company in a lurch.

– Can Datavault deliver on its ambitious growth targets? Management’s forecast of $40–50 million revenue in 2026 ([10]) is a bold leap from current levels. Achieving that implies successful integration of acquisitions (CompuSystems, NYIAX, etc.), scaling of its data exchanges, and monetization of its AI/ML offerings in biotech and other fields. Investors will be watching upcoming earnings reports to see if revenue is ramping up meaningfully. Thus far, pro-forma quarterly revenue might only be in the low-single-digit millions. Will DVLT start signing large enterprise contracts or licensing deals that move the needle? There are also questions about margins – even if revenue grows, will these lines of business be profitable? Clarity on the unit economics of DVLT’s platforms (e.g. how it earns from data exchanges or HPC services) is limited. Without strong execution, the lofty 2026 goal could remain out of reach, undermining the valuation.

– How will the legal and regulatory clouds resolve? DVLT’s lawsuit against alleged short manipulators is one facet, but there’s a broader regulatory question: might the SEC or other authorities scrutinize DVLT’s own disclosures and stock activity? The presence of a prior SEC-involved individual as CEO ([2]) invites a possibility that regulators are paying attention. Any formal inquiry or enforcement action would be a severe blow. On the flip side, if DVLT’s claims are true and some traders were illegally manipulating the stock, will that be proven and result in relief (e.g. a short squeeze or damages)? This saga will take time to play out in court, if it proceeds at all. In the interim, it injects noise and could spook potential investors or partners. Restoring credibility is an open task for DVLT’s leadership – perhaps through third-party audits, transparency on project developments, and more measured communications going forward.

– What is the endgame for Datavault AI? With Scilex poised to take a large stake, one might wonder if DVLT’s ultimate path is being a vehicle for that investor’s strategy. Scilex is a pharma company – it stated it invested for DVLT’s potential in biotech data analytics ([9]). Will DVLT pivot more to healthcare/biotech applications under Scilex’s influence? There’s also the question of whether DVLT might pursue a spin-off or sale of one of its divisions (e.g. the Acoustic Science audio business) to focus on core data science. The company’s identity is somewhat split due to its legacy audio roots. Simplifying the story could help, but so far management insists the dual-division approach is an asset. Additionally, further acquisitions might be on the table – DVLT has shown it’s willing to buy growth via stock/notes. Could NYIAX (the ad exchange) be acquired outright (it already signaled intent to buy the remaining 94.5% of NYIAX) ([13]), or other targets? While acquisitions could fuel growth, they also raise new questions (valuation paid, integration, etc.).

– How will the stock stabilize? DVLT’s share price has whipsawed from pennies (pre-split) to dollars, up and down. For current shareholders, a key question is what the “new normal” valuation will be. In the near term, newsflow (press releases, lawsuit updates, tranche approval) will drive volatility. But over a longer horizon, DVLT needs to back its valuation with fundamentals to maintain investor confidence. Will the company’s upcoming financial reports show improved results (perhaps contributions from CSI, initial deals from its data exchanges, etc.)? Any signs of positive EBITDA or at least narrowing losses would be welcomed. Alternatively, if losses deepen or promised projects get delayed, the stock could languish or further decline. Given the heavy short interest (nearly 10 million shares short as of latest data) ([14]), there’s also the technical question of a potential short squeeze if DVLT delivers good news. So far, shorts seem in control post-Wolfpack. Management’s challenge is to prove them wrong with tangible progress, not just press releases.

In conclusion, Datavault AI’s story is at a crossroads. The company is trying to transform from a struggling hardware-centric microcap into a cutting-edge AI data firm – all while battling skeptics in the market. The coming quarters will be telling. Watch for concrete revenue upticks, the fate of the Scilex funding, and any resolution to the short-seller conflict. Until those questions are answered, DVLT will remain a speculative battleground stock. Investors should stay tuned and exercise caution: in this high-stakes fight between Datavault and its detractors, the truth will emerge over time, and with it, a clearer sense of DVLT’s real value (or lack thereof).

Sources

  1. https://wisatechnologies.com/news/wisa-technologies-is-now-datavault-ai-inc
  2. https://za.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/datavault-ai-stock-tumbles-after-wolfpack-research-reveals-short-position-93CH-3953019
  3. https://za.investing.com/news/company-news/datavault-ai-closes-initial-tranche-of-150-million-bitcoin-investment-93CH-3896999
  4. https://financial-news.co.uk/datavault-ai-nasdaq-dvlt-files-federal-lawsuit-alleging-market-manipulation-defamation-and-securities-fraud/
  5. https://stocktitan.net/sec-filings/DVLT/
  6. https://ir.datavaultsite.com/sec-filings/annual-reports/xbrl_doc_only/505
  7. https://google.com/finance/quote/DVLT%3ANASDAQ
  8. https://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1682149/000141057825001857/dvlt-20250630x10q.htm
  9. https://ir.datavaultsite.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/354/datavault-ai-secures-150-million-strategic-investment-from
  10. https://ir.datavaultsite.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/326/datavault-ai-expects-2026-full-year-revenue-of-40-million
  11. https://ir.datavaultsite.com/sec-filings/all-sec-filings/content/0001410578-25-000600/dvlt-20241231x10k.htm
  12. https://investorshub.advfn.com/Datavault-AI-Inc-DVLT-46610?nextStart=63
  13. https://marketscreener.com/quote/stock/DATAVAULT-AI-INC-46404129/news/Summit-Wireless-Technologies-WiSA-Announces-Nationwide-Retail-Launch-and-Point-of-Sale-Promotion-w-29466764/
  14. https://fintel.io/ss/us/dvlt

For informational purposes only; not investment advice.